Second, dance has salient bodily aspects that complicate the question of how and why it can be conceived as a fine art, and how mind and its connection with the body is involved in the making, performing, evaluating and appreciating of dances. The dance philosopher is thus faced with these two tasks among others: 1 to show how dance is or is not properly conceived as a form of art that can be analyzed under the conceptual tools and resources developed for the traditional fine arts, 2 to discern in what precise ways traditional aesthetics might need to be changed or developed in order to accommodate dance.
For more on expression as a feature of dance see Section 5. Dance historian Selma Jean Cohen has held that expressiveness is present in all dance, causing Monroe C. Beardsley to posit that expressiveness might be a necessary if not sufficient condition for dance as art. Borrowing from action theory, Beardsley says that one causal bodily action can, under the right circumstances, be sortally generated into another kind of action.
Thus, the act of marrying can, under the right circumstances, also be bigamy.
Following Beardsley here, we can thus say that an act of running, for example, can, under the right circumstances, also be dance. The right circumstances, he maintains, might be expressiveness, as described above. We can also infer here that other conditions of dance might also apply being on a stage in a theater, being offered for appreciation as a dance, conducted in ways that are part of a dance vocabulary, etc. See Meskin for more on dances as action sequences rather than mere movements. In short, Khatchadourian says that a dance consists of movements that are not actions because they are not intentional in the traditional sense, that of being directed towards making something change in the real world rather than in the imagined world of a theatrical performance.
Khatchadourian follows Susanne K. Langer b in his claim that dance movements are not actions. Neither Beardsley nor Khatchadourian agree with Langer: Langer b would presumably agree with Khatchadourian that dance movement is not action but agree with Beardsley that the kind of movement dance creates differs in kind from movement simpliciter. Langer b explicitly includes dance as art into her system of the arts when she holds that all of the arts are in essence symbol-making endeavors.
She agrees that action is a necessary feature of dance. Both Aaron Meskin , and Pakes suggest that it is the embodiment of dance in a physical, intentional event that makes dances better construed as action-structures rather than eternal types. It is for this reason among others that they find dance to be ill-suited for analysis under a Platonic ontology of art in which the structure of the work of art is discovered rather than created. They deny that expressiveness, in the sense of either intensity or non-practicality, could be either a necessary or sufficient condition for dance.
There are many problems of identity for dance. Dances are usually known by the name and date of their first performance but subsequent performances and casts can change the structural and other qualitative features that were present in the original performance. Further, as mentioned earlier, many dances have no notated score and, if they are preserved via video or other method, subsequent performances can still deviate from these frameworks in significant and perhaps identity-changing ways.
A dance notation might also function as the jumping-off point from which to make a radically new kind of dance rather than a limitation on innovation and changes to which a dance choreographer or set of performers must adhere.
In this way dance is not unlike music for more on this see Section 3, below, and S. Davies A defining feature of allographic artforms, according to Goodman, is that their works can, in identification-relevant form, be notated. This is true in principle, even in those cases where there is no actual score.
A further problem they point out is that a dance score does not function the way a musical score or theater script typically does — it does not in practice always provide the essential features of a work or provide a recipe for subsequent performances to follow see Franko and a. For more on the differences of dance with music and theater see Section 3, below.
Whether or not Armelagos and Sirridge are right about musical scores and theater scripts here is something the reader is encouraged to consider. One might ask whether this is a relevant criticism if Goodman never sought to address dance practice. For a different account of how Goodman construes the work of art see S.
Davies , For more on dance notation in general see Guest , , and On this point against Goodman see also Levinson and Margolis Both agree, however, that a work of art is a re-performable object tied to a constitutive abstract structure. The dancer, for example, often supplies structural and stylistic elements of a dance during the course of rehearsing and performing the piece that were not specified or provided by the choreographer. Both Van Camp and Renee Conroy have argued that the ontology of dance needs to be more reflective of and responsive to actual danceworld and artworld practice.
She thus follows pragmatic methodology in its claim that it eschews essentialism, construed as a method of identifying fixed and unchanging features of a given concept, practice or entity. She also follows pragmatism in upholding pluralism, and in holding that the ongoing deliberative and decision-making practices of dance world constituents such as performers, choreographers, audiences, historians, and critics should be considered in an important way when developing an account of dance work identity. Van Camp also includes the art law community as part of this art world, suggesting that dance philosophers consider which features of a dance are given copyright protection in legal contexts.
For an additional account of why dance practice should be relevant when considering the ontology of art see D. The problem that Davies identifies is that dance-making and performing does not always stay within guidelines that would allow dance philosophers to say that this is true in all cases. This has led D. This diverges somewhat from Van Camp , who holds that the history and practice of dance allows a wide degree of variation among performances of dance works without loss of work identity.
For more on the difference between works, versions, and interpretations see S. Research by Franko on dance reconstruction provides an additional argument against the classical paradigm, the idea that a dance is repeatable, which he says is a myth that is not supported by dance practice.
A Theory of Literary Production
Even reconstruction of past dances from scores and recordings has been relatively rare among contemporary choreographers Franko Franko points out that most choreographers who seek to reconstruct past dances do not so for the purposes of repeating or performing a past structure in order to preserve it. Instead they seek to comment upon, rethink or theorize about the earlier dance in something new.
This may be true of music and of theater as well and it is something upon which the dance philosopher should reflect before assuming that this is a distinguishing feature of dance. For more on comparisons with music and theater see Section 3 below; see also S.
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Davies , —5, for a discussion of reconstructions of works of Shakespeare. Meskin has perhaps the most complicated and comprehensive ontology of dance of all, holding that when an audience experiences a dance performance we are experiencing three works of art: 1 a choreographic-work, 2 a production-work, and 3 a performance interpretation-work. He further notes that a solo performance by an individual dancer may also be its own artwork if that performance comprises the whole work. In short, by including productions and performances to the type-level of artworks Meskin provides one way to understand why the classical paradigm may be open to the objection that the dance work of art understood only as one kind of type is unstable.
Performance Theory: Volume 84 (Routledge Classics) por Richard Schechner
Differences in individual performance events, for example, may be due to differences in production- and performance interpretation-works that demonstrate or that create functional instabilities in the choreographic-work. For more on the question of What is Dance? The art of dance is closest in form to music and theater, since in many salient instances it involves a performance setting in which performers and audience members share a physical and temporal space during the course of a live performance event. For an overview of the philosophy of music see Bicknell , S. Davies , Kania , Gracyk and Kania and; for an overview of philosophy of theater see J.
The Philosophy of Dance (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Hamilton , Osipovich and Woodruff For performance in music and theater see D. Davies b, Thom and Godlovitch Unfortunately, there has been little work in philosophy of dance that addresses music and theater so the survey below will be somewhat speculative as to directions additional work in this area might take.
One of the difficulties for developing the philosophy of dance is that the methodology of philosophical analysis encourages separating out each art form in order to say what makes it distinct from every other form of art. For more on hybrid artforms see Levinson Thus that dance is most often performed to music, and that the music might in some cases be a constituting feature of the dance work of art, as in the case where a dance is created by a choreographer in conjunction with a composer, has so far eluded any sustained treatment by dance philosophers.
Igor Stravinsky, for example, composed the music for ballets either at the behest of or in conjuction with a dance company director such as with Sergei Diaghilev for The Rite of Spring and with George Balanchine for Apollo and in these cases it might be argued that the music is a constitutive feature of the dance works of art that emerged from these collaborations see S. For a history of dance as a theater art see Cohen Music and theater may be discussed in terms of general similarities and differences, as I shall do below, but this is not the same as discussing a philosophy of art that considers dance-music or dance-theater works of art.
One way that the philosophy of dance is similar to the philosophies of music and of theater is that in all three areas of inquiry there are debates about the location and nature of the work of art that is produced by these fields when they are practiced as art. Is the work of art an abstract structure and if so what kind? Is it constituted by performance? What is the role and importance of the performer or performance in connection to work ontology? There are ongoing debates about the answers to these questions in the philosophy of music and the philosopher of theater, just as there are in the philosophy of dance.
In addition close analogues to dance in theater can be found in bodily enhanced comedy such as the kind of slapstick routines to be found in vaudeville and then popularized by such performers as Charlie Chaplin, Buster Keaton, Red Skelton and Lucille Ball, and all forms of mime. Dance is also used to a large degree in musical theater — a hybrid form of dance, music, and theater.
A third similarity between the philosophy of dance and the philosophies of music and of theater is that they are all dealing with an art form that is often experienced live in front of an audience. For more on dance improvisation see Section 6, below. Since dance, music and theater share the honor of being considered among the most expressive arts, perhaps because of the typical proximity of human performers to the way these artforms are experienced, the philosophies of these arts acknowledge this.
All three also lend themselves to the philosophy of performance, including philosophies of identity and how features such as race, class, gender, sexual orientation, disability and other components of human identity are performed by a human performer who may have an identity in non-artistic life that differs from one they inhabit during the course of an artistic performance.
Rhythm is a common feature of both dance and music and thus shows up in the philosophical literature on both. In addition, both dance and theater use physical gesture as a way of communicating with audiences, creating a point of connection for the philosophies of dance and theater.
dupajegaxu.ga For dance, this is particularly true in the case of story ballets. Philosophical discussions of dance and theater are also likely to incorporate the importance of movement through space or spatiality.